Reading as device:?
Reading as deviceEach message is sealed separately for every recipient device. Pick a device here to decrypt the transcript with that device's key — exactly what that person would see. In a real deployment only the device's owner holds its private key.
the Board Chair · Principal iPhonethe Board Chair · Principal MacBookChief of Staff · COS iPhoneComms Director · Comms iPhoneComms Director · Comms iPadSummit Lead · Summit Pixel
safety #: 14612 75108 20959 01899 84127 02003 03434 63184 15827 42495 28480 39369
- the Board Chair · 8/6/2026, 6:07:28 AMLocking the run-of-show by Friday. Keep this channel tight.
- Chief of Staff · 8/6/2026, 6:07:28 AMCopy. Green room and motorcade timing confirmed.
- Summit Lead · 8/6/2026, 6:07:28 AMStage and AV walk-through tomorrow at 0900.
- Comms Director · 8/6/2026, 6:07:28 AMEmbargoed remarks drafted — sending the sealed version here only.
What the server actually stores?
On-the-wire envelopeThis is the raw record the server keeps for the latest message: iv (a one-time nonce), eph_pub (the sender's per-message public key), and ciphertext (the sealed bytes). There is no plaintext column anywhere — only a holder of the recipient device's private key can read the message.
?
On-the-wire envelopeThis is the raw record the server keeps for the latest message: iv (a one-time nonce), eph_pub (the sender's per-message public key), and ciphertext (the sealed bytes). There is no plaintext column anywhere — only a holder of the recipient device's private key can read the message.
wire.envelope
$ halo show --raw --lastiv: Kx7kvhOCUXYaXaDVeph_pub: MCowBQYDK2VuAyEAU57SpwfC7icNrgLGoiE3L6hj7pi0…ciphertext:C83VPvEYIB4giExAwwfliMvH3bm+kFRKG/ZPvnnqmCuP…plaintext: <never stored on server>